Did You Know ...

(T. S. Eliot, wearing a white rose)

One of my favorite poets, T. S. Eliot, apparently wore a white rose in his lapel to show loyalty to Richard III (whom he is supposed to have called the last legitimate English king, per this article in The New Yorker about him) and the house of York, on the anniversary of the Battle of Bosworth Field (when Richard was killed).

From this, and from the fact that the Song of Ice and Fire is (very loosely) based on the events of the Wars of the Roses, I conclude that, if he were alive today and would condescend to read science fiction or fantasy (which is probably a greater leap than bringing him back from the dead --- the man was a humongous literary snob), he would probably be a Stark fan. :)

Winter is coming!

Simon Baron-Cohen Responds to Criticism from an Autistic Blogger - Part II

Now, I'd like to focus on the first two points in Simon Baron-Cohen's response to Rachel Cohen-Rottenburg, where he addresses her argument that autistic people's generally heightened perceptual sensitivity, and our lack of any sort of filtering mechanism, tends to make us more empathic, not less.

She says:

Many of us experience such a high degree of empathy that we are constantly putting ourselves in other people's shoes and trying to see all sides in any controversy or conflict. Many of our problems with sensory and emotional overload derive from an excess of this ability, not a deficit.

He replies:

1. Rachel challenges whether people with autism have 'theory of mind' difficulties and instead argues that people with autism have high degrees of empathy.

This is however hard to reconcile with the scientific evidence. Literally dozens of studies from around the world have documented the theory of mind difficulties in autism. And the empathy difficulties are also well documented and widely replicated, both on performance tests (e.g., emotion-recognition tests from the face and voice) and on self-report measures (such as the Empathy Quotient or EQ).

Consider the latter, where 81% of people with autism score less than 30/80 on the EQ, by their own self-report, whilst only 12% of people without autism score at this low level. These results are mirrored when parents complete the EQ about their children, in many independent samples. So, whilst some people believe that theory of mind and empathy difficulties in autism are mythical, the results of many independent scientific studies suggest otherwise.
...
2. Rachel challenges whether people with autism have difficulty knowing when they have hurt others, and wishes I had not stated that children with Asperger syndrome (AS) are delayed in being able to figure out what might hurt another person. Indeed, she finds my statement hurtful.

As a working scientist, all I can do is summarize the empirical evidence. An example is the Faux Pas Test, where children are asked to identify if anyone said anything they shouldn't have said, whilst listening to short audio recorded stories. Children with AS as a group on average scored significantly lower than children without AS, despite being older than the comparison group. Indeed, the design of this experiment allowed us to estimate the size of the developmental delay in AS, since the 12 year old children with AS performed more like typical 9 year olds. So, although Rachel may not like hearing these results, this is what the science finds.

I am not Rachel, but it seems to me like she wasn't denying the existence of those results at all; just saying that those results don't tell us much of anything about what the autistic people in the various studies were actually thinking that led them to do the test "wrong." We know that autistic people don't interpret social situations the same way non-autistic people do; what we don't know is how autistic people do interpret them.

(I am basing the above paragraph on what Rachel has written in this post on the Sally-Anne test for Theory of Mind, as well as her three-part series critiquing the EQ. Her post on the Sally-Anne test, in particular, is interesting because it describes an alternate thought process for a hypothetical autistic child taking the test, and coming up with reasons why Sally might look in other places than where the researcher wants her to look. What's important is that it's not that the kid in this example can't imagine Sally's point of view, it's that ze is drawing on different thought processes and experiences to arrive at different predictions for what Sally will do. The problem with the test is that it treats all wrong answers as failures to imagine Sally's mental state.)

Because I understand Prof. Baron-Cohen's need for empirical validation of these possibilities, I've even come up with an experimental design he (or anyone) could use to evaluate the two-way-street hypothesis that I've been promulgating here.

You'd have a bunch of people, half of them autistic and half of them not, and you would group them into pairs, with each pair including one autistic and one non-autistic member, both the same sex, same age and roughly similar verbal abilities, and just have them interact together for a short while, like 5-10 minutes. You would record their interaction on video, and then you would ask each person, separately, some questions about what happened between them. What they thought felt at certain points (decided on by the researchers sometime between the actual exchange and the individual Q&A sessions), what they thought the other person was thinking or feeling at certain points. You would then compare the two participants' answers to see how well they overlapped. You would also do this with autistic/autistic and NT/NT pairings, and then compare the average degree of similarity of the paired accounts across all three permutations.

This would allow you to see whether autistic people seem to understand each other better than they do NTs, or whether NTs are equally baffled by autistics.

It would also end the stalemate between Baron-Cohen's "well, the evidence says autistic people just don't understand social situations" and autistic people's self-reported experiences of both understanding other autistic people, and of having non-autistic people spectacularly fail to understand, or empathize with, them.

Simon Baron-Cohen Responds to Criticism from an Autistic Blogger - Part I

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Many autistic and feminist bloggers have criticized Simon Baron-Cohen's theories about autism and gender differences, but not very many have had him respond to their criticisms personally. Rachel Cohen-Rottenburg is one of those lucky people; she posted a critique of his E-S theory on her blog a couple years ago, and he has just now written a ten-point response to it. In this part of the post, I talk about Rachel's objection that the characterization of autistic people as poor empathizers ignores the differences between cognitive and affective empathy, and that even autistic people who lack cognitive empathy often have great capacity for affective empathy. I also talk about Baron-Cohen's response to this objection, and how his thought on empathy and autism has undergone a further evolution in the two years since Rachel wrote her post.
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Sandrine (a French woman living in Turkey, who has an autistic son) at The Paris Ankara Express pointed me to this guest post by the famous autism researcher Simon Baron-Cohen at the Autism Blogs Directory.

In his guest post, Prof. Baron-Cohen responds to criticism of his Empathizing-Systemizing (E-S) theory of autism from Rachel Cohen-Rottenburg, who writes the blog Journeys with Autism and also curates a web-anthology on Autism and Empathy.

He identifies ten points that Rachel makes in her essay, and writes a paragraph (or two or three) addressing each one. They seem to be split about half and half between questioning Baron-Cohen's conception of empathy (as in, autistic people actually tend to be quite sensitive to other people's emotions, particularly distress) and questioning whether his model is actually any more descriptive, or helpful, than older "deficit" models.

(You could argue --- and many people do --- that the E-S/Extreme Male Brain theory is still a deficit model since it considers a deficit in empathizing skills to be a defining characteristic of autism; it offsets this by also including normal or superior systemizing skills as part of the definition, but if you look at most of the psychological, educational, or behavioral literature on autism, you find all sorts of articles on remediating, or sounding the depths of, autistic deficits and not very much on nurturing or characterizing autistic strengths. So the offset deficit model isn't actually offset all that much, in practice.)

Rachel's post is a response to this paper from 2009 (Rachel's post is also from 2009) spelling out what the E-S theory says about autism. The article describes the E-S theory, particularly its evolution from Baron-Cohen's earlier "mindblindness" theory of autism. He lists five things the earlier model failed to explain that he thinks the newer one does adequately explain: 1) nonsocial aspects of autism, like attention to detail, love of patterns or routines, stimming etc., 2) empathy isn't just "mind-reading", it's also feeling something for the other person, and the "mindblindness" model only deals with mind-reading, 3) autism isn't the only condition that can produce mind-blindness, 4) some studies have failed to find any differences in Theory of Mind between autistic and non-autistic subjects, and 5) autistic strengths.

Rachel responds that, no, actually the E-S theory doesn't do any better at explaining these things. She thinks he totally misreads stimming, for one thing: to her, it's not about "systemizing" at all, it's about self-calming. It's a way to handle emotions, not a form of empirical investigation.

She also takes issue with his contention that we lack both cognitive and affective empathy:

The everyday experience of many autistic people, all across the spectrum, contradicts the professor's theory. Many of us experience such a high degree of empathy that we are constantly putting ourselves in other people's shoes and trying to see all sides in any controversy or conflict. Many of our problems with sensory and emotional overload derive from an excess of this ability, not a deficit.
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From my contact with autistic people, it's clear to me that our empathy leads many of us to constantly question the impact of our words. While I am far from perfect, choosing my words carefully may very well rank as one of my Aspie obsessions. However, the professor believes that "the typical 9-year-old can figure out what might hurt another's feelings and what might therefore be better left unspoken. Children with Asperger syndrome are delayed by around 3 years in this skill." (Baron-Cohen, 69)
...
Baron-Cohen goes on to say that, in addition to not empathizing well, we don't know how to respond to someone even after the person tells us what's wrong.

News flash: Once someone tells me how he or she feels, I don't usually have a problem with an empathetic response. Sometimes, I'll make sure that my response is welcome, out of respect for the other person's boundaries. For instance, if a person is crying, I might ask whether the person would like a hug, or whether the person would like to talk. Some people want hugs, and some people want to be left alone. I consider it courteous to ask. Once I know people fairly well, however, and I know what works for them, I simply respond. Just ask my husband, my daughter, my daughter's friends, my friends, my former co-workers, my neighbors, and all the animals I've ever helped care for in various stages of illness.

I feel like I have to back up now, because Prof. Baron-Cohen says explicitly in his response to her (he even draws a picture!) that he thinks autistic people are only impaired in cognitive empathy, and that we are just as capable of affective empathy as anybody, which is pretty close to what Rachel was saying, too.

His thinking has shifted somewhat since he wrote the paper Rachel was responding to; in that paper, he not only doesn't say that autistic people have affective empathy, but he also implies that we are deficient in both kinds of empathy --- he mentions the EQ as a measure of both affective and cognitive empathy, and also mentions that autistic people tend to score lower on the EQ than non-autistic people:

Most people regard [Theory of Mind] as just the cognitive component of empathy in that it simply involves identifying someone else's (or your own) mental states. ... [M]issing from ToM is the second component of empathy, the response element: having an appropriate emotional reaction to another person's thoughts and feelings. This is referred to as affective empathy (Davis 1994). On the Empathy Quotient (EQ), a questionnaire is filled out either by an adult about themselves or by a parent about their child, both cognitive and affective empathy are assessed. On this scale, people with autism spectrum conditions score lower than comparison groups.

So, while Rachel's objection --- yes, we do have affective empathy --- might seem redundant to someone who has read Baron-Cohen's more recent writing on the subject of empathy (his most recent book, Zero Degrees of Empathy, contrasts autistic people with psychopaths: the former group has poor cognitive empathy but normal affective empathy, while the latter has normal cognitive empathy but poor affective empathy), she is actually bringing up something that is not addressed in the text she's working with.

(I also think there is still a problem in Baron-Cohen's work with measuring empathy --- measuring it at all, much less measuring each component separately --- in that most of the tests he uses that directly measure some aspect of empathy, like the Sally-Anne test, the Faux Pas test, or the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test, are measures of cognitive empathy only. The indirect measures, which are usually questionnaires, have their own problems. With any self-reported measures, there's a risk of stereotype threat, where the test takers' awareness of stereotypes about some group to which they belong biases their answers toward whatever the stereotype predicts: women/girls and members of some ethnic minorities, like African-Americans, Latin@s, or Native Americans, tend to do worse on math tests when they are reminded of their group membership, even by something as innocuous as a check-box at the top of the page for race and gender. Since autistic people are often taught from early childhood that their way of speaking, acting, feeling, or relating to other people is weird and wrong, I would not be surprised if they tended to rate themselves low on things like fitting in, participating in conversations or getting along with other people. Also, a lot of the questions on things like the EQ measure some mixture of cognitive and affective empathy; they ask about intuitively knowing what a person feels and then reacting to it, like knowing to comfort someone who is upset. There is one measure that has subscales geared just toward having intense feelings on other people's behalf, and that is the Interpersonal Reactivity Index, which one study found autistic people scored either very close to, or even better than, non-autistic people on all but one subscale.)

So his position on affective vs. cognitive empathy in autism has shifted somewhat since he wrote the paper Rachel was responding to, and he doesn't explicitly acknowledge that in his response to her; instead, he makes it sound like that's what he was saying all along:

Rachel says "once someone tells me how he or she feels, I don't usually have a problem with an empathic response." This is exactly the point. For most people, they don't need to be told by the other person, "I am upset." They can just read this information in the other person's facial expression, vocal intonation, or 'body language', and they can make inferences about what the other person might be thinking, in the absence of being directly told. For many people with autism these non-verbal cues may be hard to read and instead they may only know how someone feels if they are told explicitly. The evidence for this again comes from many scientific studies documenting difficulties by people with autism in reading the mind in the eyes, the face, the voice, or in action (e.g., film). Rachel's own self-description seems consistent with this: "Now, I will readily admit that I cannot infer a person's mental state by reading nonverbal cues."

But I completely agree that once it is explicitly pointed out, people with autism are very capable of an empathic response. Rachel may be surprised to hear that I agree with her on this one, but it hinges on the distinction between 'cognitive' and 'affective' empathy. Cognitive empathy is the ability to identify another person's state of mind (not just through language) and affective empathy is the drive to respond with an appropriate emotion to another person's state of mind. A growing number of studies suggest that the empathy difficulties in autism are largely restricted to the cognitive component, whilst the affective component is often intact. For this reason, people with autism are often highly motivated not to upset others or hurt others, and are themselves upset to hear that they may have done this if it is pointed out. And once they know that someone else is upset or suffering, they are very often motivated to want to help or offer comfort.

(This seems like a really patronizing response to me. She has addressed theory of mind in other parts of her post; with the passage he's quoting, she is explicitly addressing the "emotional response" aspect of empathy. To make the point that her capacity to form an empathic emotional response is working just fine, thank you, she's describing that faculty in isolation. He ignores that context so that he can go, "Ah-ha, see, she has to be TOLD what someone is feeling!" Well, no, she doesn't always. She's just describing a particular scenario where her cognitive empathy cannot be called into question --- because she doesn't have to use it --- in order to focus on her affective empathy.)

No, I am glad he understands that we care about other people, too. I still disagree somewhat with his assessment of our difficulties with cognitive empathy; that, I think, stems as much from our being profoundly different from other people in terms of our sensory and emotional responses as it does from any objective inability to "read" other people. I think he ignores just how badly non-autistic people fail to notice the signs of our distress, or misinterpret our body language or tone of voice. I think they are just as bad at reading us as we are at reading them; it's just that because they're the majority, their failure to understand us is not as disabling as our failure to understand them.

I had more things I wanted to point out about his response to Rachel, but I've ended up spending so much time untangling this one little snag where they seem to be talking past each other that I think I will split this into multiple posts.

Cat Pic of the [variable time period]

Boots, on a wicker chair on the deck. Ben is behind the chair, visible through the space under the arm.

Boots is very assertive; if something new appears, he has to get on it, play with it, bite it, or otherwise make it his own right away. Ben and Magic are more conservative; they have to wait awhile to make sure the new thing isn't a threat before they will approach it.

Two New(ish) Necklaces

One of them really is new; I made it a few days ago, and only took pictures of it today.

Here I am, modeling it: (In that light, I have to hold the camera above my head and tilt it downward somewhat to avoid triggering the flash --- it doesn't always work. But it gives a warped impression of how big my head is compared with my neck and shoulders; here's another photo taken from a more straight-on angle: you can see that my neck is actually about the same width as my face at its broadest point. But the top photo is the only one in which I'm not making some kind of "Eek! Flash! Too bright!" face.)
I took advantage of having the camera out and wearing a purple shirt to model another necklace, one I made a while ago.
I don't think any of the pictures I took of this one really do it justice; I really like the way it turned out, with the mix of colors and the little beaded panels, but if I want to get my face in the picture, too, I can't zoom in to show the details that I think are the best thing about this necklace.

With some of my jewelry, the overall shape of it is interesting enough, or big enough, that a photo of me wearing it shows something a photo of just the necklace can't show; I guess the necklaces like the second one shown here aren't in that category.

This Is Awesome

Amanda Forest Vivian has an idea that I think really rocks, and one that I definitely want to be part of.

It's a website for people with disabilities to post pictures/videos of their art, with each person getting their own site where they can showcase their art however they want:

Crazy House is the name of a book by Henry Darger, an outsider artist. Outsider art is a hard-to-define category, but many people labeled as outsider artists have psychiatric or developmental disabilities.

Crazy House the website is an imaginary house where you can have your own room. Which is to say you can apply to be hosted on the domain which I have yet to buy, and then you could make a site for your art. All of these sites would be linked to from the main page, and would make up the Crazy House.

It's perfectly worth asking why this is necessary when there are so many places on the Internet where you can upload and share art. I'm not really sure why I want to make the Crazy House, except that I like the idea of sharing an imaginary house with other people instead of just having a lot of usernames on different huge websites. I also like the idea of an art space that is somewhat centered on disabled identity.

I would like to buy the Crazy House domain with other people for two reasons. First, it would be cheaper, and second, I would like the Crazy House to be something that isn't dependent on one person, but on several people. If anyone is interested in buying the Crazy House domain with me, please email me at awf.vivian at gmail (I'm hoping to figure this out by November or December).

If anyone can't or doesn't want to be part of buying the Crazy House, but would like to room in the Crazy House, sit tight. Hopefully I will be back in November or December telling you how to do so. And please signal boost.

I don't know if I have any readers who aren't also readers of Amanda's blog, but I thought I'd try and signal-boost anyway.

I also think the idea of a smaller, self-selected group of artists having a website to showcase their art together is a cool one, and I also like the idea of each person having total control over what their own site looks like. With Flickr or other image-sharing websites, you're restricted to showing your images one at a time in a slideshow, which can take away from the effect if you've got a series of related pieces. This also gives people room to have things together on one page that are in different formats, like art, video, music, animation, whatever else.

(I am a little intimidated by the prospect of having to build my own webpage from scratch, since I don't know anything about programming, but I figure I can probably learn what I need to. My dad has built a webpage for me before, to showcase my jewelry, and I learned a bit about how to do it by watching him. It doesn't look super hard; just something I've never done before.)

Another Writer Uses "Autism" Where He Means "Selfishness" or "Amorality"

I'm getting quite a collection of examples of this sort of rhetoric, in which the writer/speaker tries to discredit someone else's political philosophy by calling it, or them, "autistic."

So far, I have a literary critic contrasting Jean-Paul Sartre's nihilism and profound alienation from other people (which he calls "autistic") with Albert Camus's more humanistic philosophy; a liberal editorial writer asking "Are Republicans Autistic?"; a liberal talk-radio host comparing Republican reliance on "talking points" to autistic verbal stims; and a liberal podcast blaming President Barack Obama's inability to overcome opposition by a vocal Republican minority on his inability to understand them, coupled with his overly scrupulous adherence to rules.

The latest addition to this group, which I saw on Emily's blog, A Life Less Ordinary?, is the author, neuroscientist and outspoken atheist Sam Harris talking about why he thinks Ayn Rand's philosophy of rational selfishness is unrealistic, morally obtuse and incompatible with actual human nature.

Here is the relevant part of that post (I'm including a bit more context for the offending one-liner than Emily did, because I'm interested in exactly what "autism" is supposed to imply here):

Many readers were enraged that I could support taxation in any form [in an earlier post on taxes and income inequality in the US]. It was as if I had proposed this mad scheme of confiscation for the first time in history. Several cited my framing of the question --- "how much wealth can one person be allowed to keep?" --- as especially sinister, as though I had asked, "How many of his internal organs can one person be allowed to keep?"

For what it's worth --- and it won't be worth much to many of you --- I understand the ethical and economic concerns about taxation. I agree that everyone should be entitled to the fruits of his or her labors and that taxation, in the State of Nature, is a form of theft. But it appears to be a form of theft that we require, given how selfish and shortsighted most of us are.

Many of my critics imagine that they have no stake in the well-being of others. How could they possibly benefit from other people getting first-rate educations? How could they be harmed if the next generation is hurled into poverty and despair? Why should anyone care about other people's children? It amazes me that such questions require answers.

...

As someone who has written and spoken at length about how we might develop a truly "objective" morality, I am often told by followers of Rand that their beloved guru accomplished this task long ago. The result was Objectivism --- a view that makes a religious fetish of selfishness and disposes of altruism and compassion as character flaws. If nothing else, this approach to ethics was a triumph of marketing, as Objectivism is basically autism rebranded. ...

And I say this as someone who considers himself, in large part, a "libertarian" --- and who has, therefore, embraced everything that was more or less serviceable in Rand's politics. The problem with pure libertarianism, however, has long been obvious: We are not ready for it. Judging from my recent correspondence, I feel this more strongly than ever. There is simply no question that an obsession with limited government produces impressive failures of wisdom and compassion in otherwise intelligent people.

This passage rests on the same assumption I noticed in the editorial "Are Republicans Autistic?", which is that autism is the same thing as selfishness. There is also the implication that to be autistic is to be profoundly ignorant of how the world works, how people are (Randians try to live by a philosophy that might work for some alien species that is 100% rational and naturally solitary, but which does not map very well onto human lives), or even the circumstances of their own lives (later in the article he mentions how much luck is involved in even the most "self-made" person's success, and alludes to people erroneously attributing to their efforts things that practically fell into their laps by virtue of their being in the right place at the right time, knowing the right people, and being the right "kind" of person).

It seems to me that it's no accident that all these rhetorical uses of "autism" to characterize a deeply selfish person or worldview are cropping up at the same time the popular conception of autism is shifting to "someone without empathy." It seems to me that those two things are actually mirror images of each other; as long as people talk about autistic people as being without empathy, autism will be the metaphorical diagnosis of choice whenever someone wants to talk about an actual lack of empathy.

So the stereotype gets reinforced from both ends.

City Mouse, Country Mouse, Autistic Mouse

There's one more thing from Unstrange Minds that stuck in my head, that I didn't think to include in this post and which probably deserves its own post anyway, given how much stuff was already in the other post.

Anyway, in the chapter on autism in South Korea, Roy Richard Grinker alludes to something I've seen mentioned before, and am curious about.

While describing differences between rural South Korean villages and the capital city of Seoul in how these communities treat their autistic members, Grinker mentions some research conducted by the World Health Organization comparing how well people with mental illnesses fare in developed vs. developing countries:

An agricultural area often belittled by Koreans and long neglected by the government, Cholla-do remains the most underdeveloped region in one of the richest countries in the world. Cholla residents are familiar with discrimination and adversity and find it hard to improve their class and social status. They consider it a great success to make one's career in Seoul, where more than 25 percent of South Korea's 44 million people now live.
...
Still, after asking a few questions here and there (Are there any children who don't speak well? Are there children here with brain disorders?), I found a sixteen-year-old boy and a nine-year-old girl in a mountainous county. Everyone seemed to know about them. And when I talked to the barber and the local grocery-store owner about them, there was no hint of discomfort or pity. Peter, as his mother wanted him to be called, was good with bicycles and served as a messenger for two villages, delivering letters and packages with a broad smile. He saw a doctor once every two months and was medicated with a small dose of an antipsychotic drug that calmed his anxiety and some of his repetitive movements. The girl, Soo-Rin, was in the village with her single mother only on weekends because she attended a special school for children with Down syndrome, cerebral palsy, and mental retardation. But everyone knew her too. Her room at home was lovely, pink with lace curtains, stuffed animals, and Disney characters. Her mother said she takes a medication at school to help her pay attention, but she didn't know what it was called. In these villages, you can find proof of something the World Health Organization has been arguing for years: People with mental disorders do better over time in remote, nonindustrial societies than in urban, industrial ones.

I'd read about that research before, in Robert Whitaker's book Anatomy of an Epidemic; in that book, he argues that the reason the people in developing countries are more likely to recover from acute mental illnesses, and don't become chronically mentally ill as often as people in developed countries, is because people in developing countries often don't have access to psychiatric medication, which Whitaker argues actually worsen a person's condition over time.

Grinker lists an earlier book by Whitaker --- Mad in America --- in his bibliography, along with a book-length follow-up to this study (full text here), but he is not making Whitaker's argument here. Instead, he thinks the people in the rural villages are more accepting than the people in the cities:

This is not to say that life for the disabled is easy in the villages --- even someone with a mild speech impediment, who is otherwise normal, will have just as much trouble finding a spouse as an urban dweller with the same problem. And parents can be just as devastated. One man confessed to me that in his despair he once took his young autistic son high up in the mountains, intending to slit his throat, but couldn't bring himself to do it. But for most parents of disabled children, life in the rich city of Seoul is more stressful than in the more humble village. One of the paradoxes of rural life is that people in the villages tend to be relatively accepting of diversity. Little remains secret, and there seems to be a place for everyone. In the rural areas, people assume that things would be much better for their children in the city. But in the city, in the sprawling, indistinguishable apartment complexes of Seoul, most people do not know their neighbors, even though they watch them as closely as they can. The pressures to measure up can seem overwhelming, and families try to keep anything that might reflect badly on their status hidden from view. The moment you bring your disabled child outside in this densely populated city is the moment you are confronted by strangers, people who will watch and judge you.

Later on, he says something that would seem to rule out Whitaker's non-drug hypothesis: the children he met in the rural villages were taking psychiatric medications, while very few of the children he met in Seoul were taking any.

He sees this as symptomatic of the prevailing viewpoint in Seoul that autism is basically a death sentence; if nothing can make an autistic child non-autistic, what's the point of drugs or therapies? It all just costs money, and with drugs there's also the matter of side effects to consider.

(I actually thought his interviewees' concern about the side effects of psychotropic drugs was sensible; I thought Grinker in this passage was being way too uncritical of US psychiatrists' willingness to prescribe these drugs to children when so little is known about their long-term or developmental effects. I think his point about the all-or-nothing mentality is a valid one --- and that mentality is certainly not restricted to South Korea! --- but I don't share his faith that drugs always lead to better quality of life. Indeed, often their use is a symptom of the same societal rigidity that he blames for making urban life so much harder for autistic people to participate in than rural life.)

Anyway, his mention of those WHO studies reminded me that I had wanted to read them (and there are still more follow-ups, meta-analyses and similar studies from more recent years, too), and post about them.